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Abstract
Whether or not banks are engaged in ex ante monitoring of customers may have
important consequences for the whole economy. We approach this question via a
model in which banks can invest in either information acquisition or market
power (product differentiation). The two alternatives generate different predic-
tions, which are tested using panel data on Finnish local banks. We find evidence
that banks’ investments in branch networks and human capital (personnel) con-
tribute to information acquisition but not to market power. We also find that man-
aging customers’ money transactions enhances banks ability to control their
lending risks.
JEL:  D21, G21, L15
Key words:  banks, information acquisition, market power, fixed costs,
branch network, default costs5
Luottokelpoisuusarvioinnin ja markkinavoiman
merkitys luottomarkkinoilla
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita  9/2000
Ari Hyytinen – Otto Toivanen
Rahoitusmarkkinaosasto
Tiivistelmä
Pankkien harjoittamalla asiakkaiden luottokelpoisuusarvioinnilla voi olla merkit-
täviä kokonaistaloudellisia seuraamuksia. Rakennamme tutkimuksessamme mal-
lin, jossa pankit voivat investoida joko luottokelpoisuusarvioinnissa tarvittavan
tiedon kokoamiseen tai hankkia markkinavoimaa nk. tuotedifferentiaatioinvesto-
intien avulla. Nämä investointipäätökset johtavat erilaisiin empiirisiin ennustei-
siin, joiden toteutumista arvioidaan käyttämällä ekonometrisessa analyysissa
suomalaisista paikallispankeista koottua aineistoa. Tuloksemme osoittavat, että
investoinnit konttoriverkoston tiheyteen ja henkiseen pääomaan (henkilöstöön)
ovat auttaneet pankkeja niiden informaatiotuotannossa, eivät niinkään markki-
navoiman hankinnassa. Myös asiakkaiden maksuliikenne (talletustilit) näyttäisivät
tuottavan tietoa, jota pankit voivat hyödyntää luottoriskien vähentämisessä.
Asiasanat: pankit, luottokelpoisuusarviointi, markkinavoima,
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A great deal of empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that banks earn rents
(eg Fama 1985, Cosimano and McDonald 1998, Molyneux et al 1994 and the
wave of recent bank mergers). In this paper we contrast - within a unified model-
ing framework - the two main theoretical explanations for these rents that are pre-
sented in the literature and test their empirical validity.
A flood of literature (eg Leland and Pyle 1977, Fama 1985, Broecker 1990,
Sharpe 1990) suggests that banks’ raison d’etre is to collect and analyze informa-
tion, an activity that we refer to as ‘information acquisition’. Banks could, as eg in
Broecker’s model, test customers for their creditworthiness in order to avoid ad-
verse selection. Such efforts at learning the customer’s type can give the bank an
information advantage that can be translated into a larger share of the surplus. An
equally old and extensive literature (eg Klein 1971, Degryse 1996) argues that
banks’ rents derive from industrial organization-type sources relating to a small
number of firms (oligopolistic market), product differentiation, and/or price dis-
crimination that is not based on customers’ risk characteristics.
1 We refer to these
sources of rents collectively as ‘market power’.
2
Whether banks are engaged in one or the other activity may have significant
consequences outside the industry itself: a large literature suggests that banks’
(in)ability to solve informational problems affects the severity of the effects of
macro-level shocks (eg Greenwald and Stiglitz 1993, Holmstrom and Tirole
1997). It is therefore critical to know whether, and through what mechanisms,
banks collect and process information. There exists indirect evidence that banks
are indeed in the business of acquiring information.
3 The main purpose of this
paper is to provide a test of the PHDQV by which banks acquire information.
A common feature of information acquisition and market power is that they
are both likely to require fixed investments (but see Petersen and Rajan 1994 and
section 4 below). Notwithstanding recent investments in electronic banking,
commercial banks' most obvious of such investments are those in branch networks
and employees' human capital. We argue that investments in branches and human
capital can serve two basic purposes: information acquisition and/or market
power. Information acquisition requires personnel who are able to collect and
analyze information, and investments in human capital increase these abilities.
Since information is often local, a local presence in the form of a branch may fa-
                                                
1  See Freixas and Rochet (1997) for a comprehensive treatment of both bodies of literature.
2  There is of course a huge empirically oriented literature on banking. For example, Spiller and
Favaro (1984) test the market power hypothesis. However, to the best of our knowledge these
empirical papers are not concerned with the questions studied here. A paper by Petersen and Rajan
(1994) comes close in that they study the effects of long-term relationship on credit terms.
3 Petersen and Rajan (1994) find that firms with longer bank relationships have better access to
credit. James (1987) finds that the stock market reacts favorably to news about new bank loans.
Cressy and Toivanen (1998) cannot reject the Null hypothesis of symmetric information when
testing the determinants of loan contracts, and attribute this to bank information acquisition. Mes-
ter et al (1998) independently from and concurrently with us, find that checking accounts provide
banks with information about the riskiness of loans.8
cilitate the collection of information.
4 The idea here is that distance between bor-
rowers and lenders does matter as regards monitoring (Petersen and Rajan 2000).
But equally plausibly, one could argue that a large branch network enables the
bank, via product differentiation that is either horizontal (providing services close
by to a larger clientele) or vertical (providing a denser network of services to a
given customer), to increase its price-cost margins. Likewise, a better-trained and
educated workforce may result in higher levels of service provision - with similar
consequences. A third motivation for fixed costs arises from the deposit side. By
offering deposit customers more conveniently located and faster services, a bank
may be able to attract deposits at lower interest rates. This is an interesting propo-
sition, which warrants greater attention than can be afforded within the scope of
this paper. We do not model the deposit side explicitly, but carefully control for it
in the empirical model by including, as endogenous explanatory variables, deposit
interest rate(s) and the share of deposits in total bank funding.
Our modeling framework encompasses two alternative models, a monitoring
model and a product differentiation model, and is based on earlier work (William-
son 1986, 1987, Shaked and Sutton 1982, 1983). In the monitoring model, a bank
can acquire monitoring technology that can be used to test loan applicants for a
pay-off relevant characteristic. This allows banks ‘to focus their attention on in-
formation gathering to a particular set of issues: those associated with the prob-
ability of default and the net worth of the firm in those low-return states’ (Stiglitz
1985, p. 143). The idea is that banks can spend resources so as to be able to in-
spect entrepreneurs before granting loans and thereby produce information on the
value (eg in terms of liquidity) of a project to a bank in the default state.
5 This can
have important ramifications. For example, in the Stiglitz-Weiss-type credit-
rationing framework of Rousseau (1998), it leads to a narrower loan-deposit
spread and eventually to financial deepening. The recovery rate of loans is also an
important input in modern credit risk models, such as J.P. Morgan’s CreditMet-
rics or Credit Suisse’s CreditRisk
+. The second version of the model is a product
differentiation model that is close in spirit to Shaked and Sutton (1982). The dif-
ferentiation is thought to reflect financial service quality, bank-customer relation-
ships and possible switching costs.
After presenting the two theoretical models, we build an econometric model
that encompasses both and test the models’ predictions using data from Finnish
cooperative banks. These banks are small local banks that operate in geographi-
cally distinct, non-overlapping markets. They share several common features like
ownership form and a quasi-central bank. As a group, they have by far the largest
branch network, suggesting that they have made fixed investments. Although
these banks share many features and institutions, they operate independently.
Their common features (discussed in more detail in section 3) suggest eg that they
use their branches for the same purpose, be it information acquisition or market
power. This is important because our model suggests that in equilibrium a bank
can be a non-monitor or monitor and of high or low quality. A random sample of
banks might lead to an incorrect inference regarding the role of fixed costs. Es-
sentially, having banks that have a common mode of operation and that operate in
                                                
4 We have been told that in the 1970s and 1980s, a Finnish bank’s policy was that its local mana-
gers have to become members of either the local Lion’s, or Rotary’s. Although this can partially be
explained by them being able to attract business in this way, an alternative explanation is that they
were thus in a position to better gather local information.
5 Wang and Williamson (1998) argue and provide casual evidence that such ex ante monitoring
involves larger investments than ex post monitoring.9
separate markets enables us to identify empirically the role of fixed costs.
6 Varia-
tion in local conditions across and within regions as well as over time (see sec-
tion 3) means that the optimal level of such investments is bank- (and period-)
specific, which allows us to measure the effects of branches and personnel on
bank performance. As discussed below, bank size and certain sample-specific
features may cause spurious correlations between our dependent variables and our
measures of fixed investment. Therefore we carefully control for such correlations
in the empirical analysis.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we
present and solve the monitoring model. For reasons of space, we only briefly
explain the main results of the vertical product differentiation model; a detailed
analysis is contained in appendix 2. We wish to emphasize that the models are
purposefully rather stylized and are to be regarded as examples of formal models
from which the more general hypotheses tested in the empirical part can be gener-
ated. For example, it may well be the case that a bank uses its fixed investments
for both information acquisition and market power purposes - a possibility ex-
cluded from our theoretical models. Our empirical specification is more general
and allows for this and other possibilities. In section 3, we present and discuss the
data. Section 4 provides our econometric setup and empirical results, and in sec-
tion 5 we offer some brief concluding remarks.
                                                
6  One way to deal with this would be to estimate different equations for monitoring and non-
monitoring banks using eg switching regressions.10
2  The Theoretical Model
2.1  The Modeling Framework
Consider a universally risk-neutral economy with two banks and a continuum of
entrepreneurs distributed (with unit density) over a compact subset ' of 
2 Â . Each
entrepreneur has an initial endowment of :> 0, which he can invest either in a
safe project generating a payoff : ˆ  > : or in a risky project requiring an initial
investment of size .>:. If the risky project is undertaken, it yields a random
cash flow ;. Neither the size of the project nor the initial endowment vary across
entrepreneurs. We therefore normalize the entrepreneur’s funding need to unity, ie
.-:º 1. The two banks are the only source of outside finance for entrepreneurs
in this economy. The banks are only willing to buy standard debt contracts, and
we let 5denote the entrepreneur’s payment if the project succeeds. The safe and
risky projects are mutually exclusive, and the banks obtain loanable funds at a
constant cost, denoted r.
7
We denote by[ the realized cash flows generated by the risky projects and
by I([) and)([) respectively the probability density function (pdf) and cumulative
density function (cdf) of the distribution of cash flows. The distribution I([) is
assumed to be positive and differentiable on (0 ¥) and identical for all entrepre-
neurs. As in Williamson (1986, 1987), a cash flow realization [ is costlessly ob-
servable to the entrepreneur in question whereas a bank must pay an auditing cost
to observe it. We further assume that despite auditing the bank can recover only [
-Y, Y³ 0, where Y represents a leak to outsiders plus the auditing cost in states
where the entrepreneur fails to meet his debt service obligation. The amount of
this leak varies by entrepreneur and banks know costlessly only the distribution of
Y (see below). One may think of Y as a determinant of the recovery rate of loans
and bankruptcy costs, ie general liquidation costs, legal fees, costs of selling spe-
cialized equipment, and other costs that are deducted from proceeds that should
go to debtors. Borrowers cannot credibly reveal the value of Y to lenders.
We assume that the continuum of observationally identical entrepreneurs
consists of types that can be characterized by an ordered pair (Yq), where q ³ 0.
Thus, firstly, the entrepreneurs differ w.r.t. Y, ie the payments made to third par-
ties in bankruptcy states. In particular, Y is distributed according to marginal pdf
J(Y) and cdf *(Y) and has support [] . 0   , , 0 > Y Y  Secondly, the entrepreneurs value
the quality and availability of bank services. The extent to which an entrepreneur
values these depends on a characteristic q, which is a non-negative real number. It
is assumed that this parameter is distributed according to marginal pdf ](q) and
cdf =(q)on [ ] . 0   , , 0 > q q
The following assumptions hold throughout the analysis:
$VVXPSWLRQ$7KHUDQGRPFDVKIORZVDUHGUDZQIURPDQH[SRQHQWLDOGLVWULEX
WLRQLH;a([SlZLWKVXSSRUW¥DQGH[SHFWHGYDOXH([ l
                                                




VXFKWKDWY £ Y ˆ DQGq£ q ˆ7KHPDUJLQDOGLVWULEXWLRQVRIERWKqDQGYDUHXQLIRUP
GLVWULEXWLRQLHqaU[0,q ]DQGYaU[] Y , 0 
8
To complete the description of our general modeling framework, we model a two-
stage game. In the first stage, banks enter simultaneously and each can make a
costly investment of fixed size. If made, this investment allows the bank to either
test customers for their Y or to produce a high(er) quality service. In the second
stage, banks compete for entrepreneurs by announcing independently but sequen-
tially their loan interest rates. It has been suggested that the identity of the Stack-
elberg leader may depend eg on the size of firms, distribution of information and
characteristics of customer bases, or it may be a result of non-cooperative timing
competition. To allow for variation in leader-follower roles, we assume that they
are randomly determined. The probability that bank L gets to move first and an-
nounce its interest rates(s) is ½. The other bank is then able to observe these, takes
them as given, and chooses its own interest rate(s). With the complementary prob-
ability the roles are reversed. As we will see, the realization of these leader-
follower roles will play a major part in the banks' equilibrium strategies. Sequen-
tial second stage competition is adopted because no pure strategy Nash equilib-
rium exists in a simultaneous move loan pricing game with (asymmetrically)
monitoring banks (for a model exhibiting a similar feature with partially overlap-
ping customer classifications, see Broecker 1990). We begin with the monitoring
model and later analyze the Shaked-Sutton-type model of vertical product differ-
entiation.
2.2  The Monitoring Model
We first describe the nature of the monitoring technology and then derive Nash
equilibrium loan pricing strategies as a function of banks’ monitoring invest-
ments, conditional on the realization of the randomly determined leader-follower
roles. Finally, we characterize the subgame perfect monitoring decisions.
7KH0RQLWRULQJ7HFKQRORJ\ In order to keep the analysis tractable, we
will restrict ourselves to a dichotomous monitoring variable, PL, with  {} 1 , 0 Î L P .
When the investment is made by bank L, PL = 1 and two classes of entrepreneurs
are created: good (*) and bad (%) entrepreneurs. Specifically, by paying a strictly
positive fixed fee 0, the bank can ascertain whether an entrepreneur is of a better
or of worse type than Y ~ ,
9 implying that the interval [] Y , 0  is divided into two
                                                
￿ We would like to emphasize that assumption A1 is imposed for the sake of concreteness. On the
one hand, our analysis does not seem to be particularly dependent on the specific postulated form
of I([) . On the other hand, the cost of using a general I([) with certain restrictions is that explicit
expressions for equilibrium interest rates cannot be derived. Though the independence assumption
(A2) has no relevance in the monitoring model, it does simplify the product differentiation model
in the sense that the provision of higher quality banking services does not affect the expected
bankruptcy costs in a bank’s loan portfolio.
9 The threshold is common to both banks.12
subintervals by the insertion of point Y ~  such that  Y Y < < ~ 0 
10 Let  % * *% È º
and Y(S) and Q(S) denote the average Y and mass of entrepreneurs in category
{} * % S , Î , respectively. Clearly, for Y ~  > 0, we have  ) ( ) ( ) ( % Y *% Y * Y < <  and
Q(%) (1-*(Y ~ )) > 0 and Q(*) *(Y ~ ) > 0.
The above implies two possibilities. A bank having no monitoring ability
(NM-bank) must treat its customers as a single entity, *%, to whom it quotes a
single rate  10 5  whereas a monitoring bank (M-bank) is able to determine
whether a given entrepreneur belongs to * or % and so could quote different inter-
est rates,  % 0 * 0 5 5 , ,   and   , for the two entrepreneur classes.





The banks are not allowed to cross-subsidize between entrepreneur classes nor
can either observe the outcome of its competitor's monitoring activity. An entre-
preneur cannot credibly reveal the monitoring outcome of bank L to bank M because
a monitoring report by a rival bank is assumed not to be verifiable. Finally, ex
ante monitoring does not reduce the ex post need for auditing nor the associated
costs.
By assumption, in this section, no quality difference between banks
emerges. We therefore normalize the level of banks’ service quality to zero. In
what follows we derive equilibrium interest rates under symmetric and asymmet-
ric monitoring investments, conditional on the realization of leader-follower roles.
/RDQ3ULFLQJ8QGHU6\PPHWULF0RQLWRULQJ,QYHVWPHQWV If both banks
invest in monitoring ( 1 = = M L P P ), they are alike. Competition will be Bertrand
with homogeneous goods in both entrepreneur classes, % and *. The follower bank
will undercut the leader’s offer to entrepreneurs in class S provided that this yields
non-negative expected profits. Since the expected utility of an entrepreneur is
5 5





= = - =ò
1
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( (1)
we have  0 ) ( ’ < - =
- 5 H 5
l m . The most attractive interest rate offer the leader can
make to entrepreneurs in class S while avoiding undercutting is thus obtained as a
solution to
                                                
10 Of course, other assumptions could be made on the nature of monitoring technology. For instan-
ce, allowing for more entrepreneur classes (defined similarly by the two banks) would enlarge the
strategy space that a bank can consider in setting specific rates for different customer classes. Ho-
wever, this extension would increase the length of the analysis by increasing the number of cases
that need to be considered in both stages of the game. Moreover, if in this environment a bank can
acquire a technology that allows it to create another class, the analysis would correspond very
closely to that pursued in this paper. Another alternative would be to postulate a continuous mo-
nitoring variable such that eg all good entrepreneurs with small Y could be perfectly identified. Not
surprisingly, this creates technical problems since a bank no longer chooses a finite number of
interest rates but rather designs an optimal interest rate offer function during the second stage of
the game. In particular, when acting as the price leader, the design of such an offer function is
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where  {} * % S , Î . The zero profit interest rate for entrepreneur class S solving (2)
is denoted 
0
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An entrepreneur’s participation constraint is satisfied as long as the rate charged is
equal to or less than a ‘monopoly’ rate, 5
￿given by
) ˆ / ) ( ln( ) (
* : [ ( [ ( 5 = (4)
where by assumption  : [ ( ˆ ) ( > In order to ensure that the banks’ individual ra-
tionality constraints are not violated for any entrepreneur class when financed at

















This condition ensures also that entry deterrence is not a feasible form of pre-
emptive market behavior. Note finally that  0 )) ( , ( ’ > S Y 5 p . This property of the
banks’ payoff functions implies that the model exhibits no credit rationing with
some borrowers receiving loans and others not. This differs from Williamson
(1987) in which the costs of verifying adverse project outcomes leads to such ra-
tioning.
To sum up, both banks announce in equilibrium the zero-profit interest rates
for * and %. As a consequence, the follower has no incentive to undercut the
leader’s offer. Entrepreneurs, by assumption 3, choose their banks randomly and
the banks’ expected profits are zero. A similar equilibrium prevails if neither bank
invests in monitoring ( 0 = = M L P P ), the only difference being that in this case
each bank offers a single interest rate to all entrepreneurs in *%.
/RDQ3ULFLQJ8QGHU$V\PPHWULF0RQLWRULQJ,QYHVWPHQWV If banks have
made asymmetric monitoring investments (eg  0 = L P  and  1 = M P ), the M-bank
has more competitive instruments than the NM-bank. It remains for us to deter-
mine the optimal interest rate setting rule. Not surprisingly, realization of the
leader-follower roles determines to what extent the M-bank distinguishes the two
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The M-bank always earns positive expected profits (only) from the group of good
entrepreneurs. Despite this, good borrowers pay on average a lower interest rate
for their loans than bad customers. As the leader, the M-bank sets an interest rate
schedule that provides a price umbrella under which the NM-bank may set its rate.
This softens the undercutting strategy of the non-monitoring follower and leads to
pricing out of the group of bad entrepreneurs. The result is close to the finding of
Chan and Thakor (1987), who somewhat surprisingly find that KLJK-quality bor-
rowers may be priced out of the market but not explicitly denied loan, despite a
bank having idle deposits. This way of pricing loans differs sharply from the
situation in which the M-bank is the follower. In such a loan market, loan custom-
ers are effectively offered a pooling contract despite the bank’s ability to dis-
criminate between them. Finally, from the perspective of the NM-bank, there is a
positive spillover from the monitoring investment of its rival: despite Bertrand-
type competition and homogeneous products, the NM-bank earns positive ex-
pected profits in equilibrium.
7KH0RQLWRULQJ,QYHVWPHQW In stage one each bank L chooses to monitor
( 1 = L P ) or not to monitor ( 0 = L P ) without knowing whether it is the leader or
follower in stage 2. Under symmetric investments, the expected profits are zero.
Under asymmetric investments they are gross of the fixed monitoring cost 0 (see
appendix 1):





1 > + º = * Y 5 * Y 5 % Y
LQG
* M L p p p p (5a)
0 )) ( , ( ) 0 , 1 ( ) 1 , 0 (
*
2
1 > º = % Y 5 M L p p p (5b)
where ½ is the probability of bank L becoming the Stackelberg leader. Taking into
account 0, the expected profits of the two banks are as summarized in the fol-
lowing payoff matrix:15
3D\RII0DWUL[ Expected equilibrium profits for monitoring choice out-
comes.
PM = 0 PM = 1
PL = 0 0,0 ) ) 1 , 0 ( ( ), 1 , 0 ( 0 M L - p p
PL = 1 ) 0 , 1 ( ), ) 0 , 1 ( ( M L 0 p p - 0,0
Consider the simultaneous entry of the banks and assume that the fixed invest-
ment generating monitoring service is feasible, ie that  0 M L > = ) 1 , 0 ( ) 0 , 1 ( p p . As




Note that the equilibrium is unique up to the reversal of banks’ indices. The rea-
son for this result is that identical investments lead to Bertrand competition and
zero profits, whereas with one bank investing in monitoring, ERWK make strictly
positive expected profits.
11
We can now state the empirical predictions of the monitoring model. Propo-
sitions 1 and 2 directly imply that the M-bank finances projects that have higher
values in the default state compared to the projects financed by the NM-bank.
Depending on the realization of the leader-follower roles, it also charges interest
rates that are either strictly lower than or the same as those charged by the NM-
bank. We thus have
3URSRVLWLRQ7KH0EDQNFKDUJHVRQDYHUDJHORZHULQWHUHVWUDWHVDQGFRQGL
WLRQDO RQ WKH LQWHUHVW UDWHV FKDUJHG IDFHV VPDOOHU ORDQ ORVVHV UHODWLYH WR WKH
DPRXQWRIORDQVH[WHQGHGWKDQWKH10EDQN
12
2.3  The Product Differentiation Model
For reasons of brevity, we do not present the detailed analysis of the product dif-
ferentiation model here in the main text, but refer the reader to appendix 2. The
results are also very much in line with standard vertical product differentiation
models (eg Shaked and Sutton 1982).
As explained, the basic setup is the same as in the monitoring model. Banks
can simultaneously make fixed investments in the first stage. Here the investments
are aimed at improving product quality; entrepreneurs value quality but differ in
their valuations, q. Entrepreneurs’ valuation of quality is independent of their de-
fault costs. In the second stage, conditional on their quality investments, the banks
                                                
11 We have also analyzed the case where banks enter the market sequentially and the entry order is
random. In such a case, one can derive a threshold level that determines whether or not the bank
entering first/last invests in monitoring.
12 These empirical predictions are not specific to our model of information acquisition; eg Rousse-
au’s (1998) model predicts that a bank that invests in new technology will at least temporarily
charge lower interest rates and have less defaults.16
compete by setting interest rates sequentially. As in the monitoring model, the
leader-follower roles are determined randomly. Investments in quality do not al-
low the banks to obtain information about an individual customer’s type.
As shown in detail in appendix 2, having both banks investing in quality is
not equilibrium, as they would make zero profits. Nor is having neither bank in-
vest in quality equilibrium, as long as the cost of investment in quality are not too
high. Under that assumption, an asymmetric market structure emerges. The fol-







As the investing bank offers higher quality, it can charge a premium in the form of
higher interest rates. The higher interest rates naturally imply that, ceteris paribus,
it faces higher default costs, but after controlling for that effect, default costs are
identical.
In section 4 we will turn to the empirical specification of our model. The
next section discusses the market and the data.17
3  The Finnish Banking Market and
the Cooperative Banks
3.1  The Data and Market Environment
Currently, partly as a result of the severe economic crisis in Finland in the early
1990s, the Finnish banking market is dominated by a few banks/banking groups,
one of which consists of over 250 local cooperative banks. Our sample covers
almost all of these banks. The other traditional group of local banks, the savings
banks, were the most prominent victim of the banking crisis and have been dra-
matically reduced in size as a consequence of a) a large merger between them and
b) a splitting of the merged bank between the remaining banking groups in 1993.
As a result of mergers, the three main banking groups in Finland consist of the
group of cooperative banks, which we focus on here, and two commercial banks
operating on the national level and having a nationwide branch network. Several
studies (eg Koskenkylä and Vesala 1994, Nyberg and Vihriälä 1994, Davis 1995)
describe the events before and during the crisis, so we will offer only a synopsis
here. The volume of lending grew very rapidly, at times by over 30% p.a. in the
late 1980s. The growth was partly due to financial market liberalization that took
place in the mid-1980s and partly due to an economic boom and lax monetary
policy. The boom ended in a collapse of asset values, including real estate, which
was a prime source of collateral, and the economy shrank by 8% in 1992 - 1994.
Since then, the economy has been growing. The government bailout of banks has
officially been estimated to cost approximately FIM 50 billion. Importantly for us,
not a single bank was allowed to fail; hence sample selection is not an important
issue.
13 Nonetheless, the crisis may affect our results and so we check the robust-
ness of our empirical results in this respect.
A comparison of the nationwide branch networks of different banking
groups (see table 1) reveals that as a group the cooperative banks have by far the
largest branch network.
14 It is clearly larger than that of the other group of local
banks, the savings banks. The size of the branch network of commercial bank
Merita is roughly two thirds or less then that of the cooperative banks. This sup-
ports our implicit assumption that these are banks that have made (larger) fixed
investments.
15
                                                
13 During our sample period, all banks were required by law to belong to a security fund. Coopera-
tive banks were members of the cooperative banks’ security fund.
14  Of the comparison banks/banking groups, Savings Bank of Finland (SBF) was created by a
merger of most local savings banks, and was dismantled in 1993. Merita is the largest bank in
terms of balance sheet total, formed through a merger of the two previously largest commercial
banks. The branch networks of the two largest banks have been added together in the table to al-
low comparisons, and as such Merita’s figures represent an upper bound.
15 The second remaining bank operating nation-wide, besides Merita, is excluded from the table.
The reason for this is that it is the government owned former postal savings bank. During our
sample period, it had clearly the smallest number of own branches, but did provide some services
through post offices.18
7DEOH Nationwide branch networks of Finnish banks/banking
groups
Cooperative banks Merita Savings banks
1993 977 673 859
1994 993 776 248
1995 960 619 250
1996 893 479 242
Note: The 1993 figure for savings banks includes Savings Bank of
Finland, which was dismantled by end-1993. Figures provided by the
Finnish Bankers’ Association.
Cooperative banks are mostly small local banks that share a common organiza-
tional form and certain institutions. For example, they own a ‘central bank’, have
an association that collects and disseminates information, and share other facilities
usually found in the headquarters of a bank. Though most decision making power
is at the level of individual banks, group coherence and guidelines from the com-
mon bodies affect the behavior of individual banks in an essential way. During the
boom years of the late 1980s, the cooperative banks were among the more conser-
vative banks. For example, the volume of their lending grew less than that of de-
posit banks on average. They also experienced a smaller surge in the amount of
bad loans during the crisis in the early 1990s (see eg Koskenkylä and Vesala
1994). Compared to other banking groups, cooperative banks are clearly more
focused on private customers, agriculture, and small business.
16 As a matter of
fact, cooperative banks are the biggest source of loans to agriculture and SMEs.
17
Given the special nature of agricultural loans, one could conjecture that banks
with branch networks covering large geographic areas tend to be those that oper-
ate in the countryside and that these banks direct a relatively larger proportion of
their loans to agriculture. As these loans are guaranteed by the government, we
might observe a spurious correlation between branch network size and defaults
and interest rates. We address this question in the empirical analysis.
We have data on 250 cooperative banks over the period 1992 - 1996. We
use a relatively short and recent panel to exclude the 1980s, as the consensus view
is that banks had not yet by the 1980s learned to operate in a liberalized environ-
ment. Another reason is to allow time for banks to adjust their branch networks
and personnel to levels that are optimal under deregulated conditions; such ad-
justments necessarily take time. The descriptive statistics for our sample are given
in table 2. Although these banks share several features, they are a rather diversi-
fied group: The smallest bank’s loans amount to just over FIM 6 million, whereas
for the largest ones loans amount to almost FIM 4000 million (about EUR 670 m);
the mean is FIM 257 million.
18 On average, the banks’ deposit totals (mean FIM
284 m) seem to slightly exceed their loans. We have calculated four interest rates,
                                                
16 The cooperative banks were originally established to channel government loans to small farms
that had difficulties in getting loans from established banks. This was their main line of business
until the 1950s (personal correspondence with historian Antti Kuusterä). The cooperative banks’
joint market share of SME lending has been around 40%.
17 The prevailing legislation guarantees loans made to farms. Hence these do not expose banks to
credit risk.
18 There has been some consolidation within the cooperative banks. Whenever two or more banks
have merged, our data treats them as if they had merged prior to our observation period. A merger
dummy did not turn out to be significant in the estimations.19
two of which pertain to revenue (customer loans and interbank lending, mainly to
other banks), two of which pertain to costs (deposits and interbank borrowing,
from other banks). The deposit interest rate is lower than that for interbank bor-
rowing, although there is variation across banks. The reverse applies for loans
granted. Banks receive a clearly higher interest rate on customer loans than on
interbank lending.
7DEOH Descriptive statistics for bank-level data
Variable definition  Mean St.Dev
DEP = Amount of deposits in year t, FIM m 293.56 486.47
LOAN = Amount of credit market loans in year t, FIM m 258.47 474.90
RD = Deposit interest rate in year t, calculated as interest rate ex-
penses/amount of deposits
0.0390 0.0184
RL = Loan interest rate in year t, calculated as interest rate income/amount
of outstanding loans
0.0933 0.0166
RDM = Interbank market deposit interest rate in year t, calculated as inter-
est rate expenses/amount of interbank deposits
0.0650 0.0194
RDEP = Ratio of deposits to total funding 0.8551 0.0851
RLM = Interbank market loan interest rate in year t, calculated as interest
rate income/amount of outstanding interbank loans
0.0556 0.0216
DEFR = Net write-offs in year t/amount of outstanding loans in
 year t. DEF=ln(0.000001+DEFR) is used in the estimations
0.0141 0.0201
BRA = Number of branches at start of year t divided by the size (in square
kilometers) of the market area
0.0079 0.0157
PERS = Amount of personnel expenses in year  (FIM m) divided by num-
ber of branches at start of year t
3.2621 6.2004
INEFF = Ratio of non-interest expenses in year t to non-interest revenues 0.7126 0.3012
SBFD = Dummy variable taking value of 1 for 1993-1995 if the bank
bought a part of the dismantled SBF bank in 1993
0.3104 0.4628
NOTE: data provided by the Central Bank of Finnish Cooperative Banks; all data on bank level,
period 1992-1996. There are 250 banks in the data.
One of the variables of most interest in this study is the level of default costs.
These are measured by net write-offs, ie the difference between write-offs and
recoveries. As eg in Angbazo (1997), net writeoffs will proxy for asset quality and
expected defaults (relative loan losses), and we have calculated it as a percentage
of loans extended (excluding interbank loans). The percentage of default costs
('()5LW) varies between 0 and 18.5%, with a mean of 1%.
19 As pointed out ear-
lier, in autumn 1993 the Savings Bank of Finland (SBF) was dismantled through a
sale of parts of its balance sheet (loans and deposits) and branches to its rival
banks (see eg Vihriälä 1997 for details). In our sample, 97 banks were involved in
the operation, and in the estimations we control for it via an SBF dummy (6%)')
(see table 2). It is naturally true that such bank-level averages may hide wide
variations. For two reasons, this should not be a great concern. First, our sample
selection conditions out all but cooperative banks, which, as noted above, are
much more homogeneous than banks in general. Second, and even more impor-
tant, our theoretical predictions are concerned with bank-level averages.
As our main measure of service accessibility (quality) DQG banks’ ability to
gather local information, we use the number of branches per square kilometer DW
WKHVWDUWRIWKH\HDU(%5$LW) which varies between 1.212*10
-5 and 0.154 and has a
mean of 0.008. Importantly for us, %5$LW should be negatively correlated with av-
erage distance between bank and borrowers. The idea behind this definition is that
                                                
19 There are a few observations with negative '(), mainly due to recoveries.20
geographical proximity and distance are important determinants of service acces-
sibility and information acquisition. The longer the distance, the higher the costs
of acquiring information and monitoring borrowers. This view is supported by
Petersen and Rajan (2000) who document, among other things, that distance is a
good indicator of creditworthiness. The same argumentation applies for invest-
ments in quality: customers may value a large, geographically dense branch net-
work that allows them easier access to services (see in particular Evanoff 1988).
Given geographical proximity, a branch is the more effective in providing services
and/or acquiring information, the more and better-trained its staff. To take into
account the role of staff we use as another measure of fixed costs personnel ex-
penses per branch (3(56LW). It varies from FIM 0.018 million to FIM 61.014 mil-
lion per branch. The most obvious alternative way to measure branch density is to
use a population-based measure. We test the robustness of our results (see section
4.3) by using as an alternative to %5$LW the variable %5$S, defined as the number
of branches per capita.
Because macroeconomic conditions vary markedly over the observation pe-
riod, we checked the annual descriptive data on the banking variables for anoma-
lies and/or outliers but found none (see appendix 3).
7DEOH Descriptive statistics: market level data
Variable definition  Mean St.Dev
POPULAT = Total population 18.197 36.575
DENS = Ratio of population to area (in square kilometers) 24.407 62.868
OWNH = Ratio of persons living in their own homes to total population 0.298 0.025
FARM = Number of farms 484.445 516.401
WCAP = Taxable wealth per capita 52.248 11.773
UN = Unemployment rate 0.202 0.047
STUDENT = Ratio of students to total population 0.077 0.013
EDUC = Ratio of persons having a masters or Ph.D degree to total popu-
lation
0.057 0.018
AGRIC = Ratio of persons employed in farming, fishing or other agricul-
tural industries to total workforce
0.275 0.149
SERCON = Ratio of persons employed in services, construction or manu-
facturing to total workforce
0.322 0.106
OUTSIDE = Number of persons living in the market area but working
outside the area
0.155 0.087
NOTES: data (1992-1995) provided by Statistics Finland
As to the operating environment of cooperative banks, they operate in different,
non-overlapping markets. Quite in line with what the banks themselves do, a
bank’s market is here defined as the counties in which it has branches. Typically,
there are very few competitors in the market so that competitive conduct is, along
the lines of our theoretical model, essentially duopolistic. Most often the rival is
either a savings bank or one of the nationwide commercial banks. Only in the
larger cities is this generalization less appropriate. In table 3 we present descrip-
tive statistics on the banking markets. This demographic and socioeconomic data
was available to us only for 1992 - 1995. As can be seen, the markets vary in
terms of population and density, average wealth, number of farms, unemployment
rate, and average education level.21
3.2  Cooperative Banks: Profit Maximization vs
Managerial Rent-seeking
A special issue concerning our data that should be discussed is banks’ ownership
forms. One can argue that, contrary to our theoretical model, a cooperative bank
may not seek to maximize profits. The danger in this case would be that we ob-
serve a spurious correlation between our dependent variables and measures of
fixed investment that agrees with predictions of our model but which is due to
non-profit maximizing behavior. However, we would argue that, conditional on a
break-even assumption, our hypotheses hold even if managers are rent-seekers.
Moreover, there are several empirical reasons why the assumption of profit
maximization seems to be valid here.
Without attempting to model managerial rent-seeking formally, it seems
plausible to assume that even rent-seeking management has to break even, which
does leave scope for non-profit maximizing behavior at the margin. However, as
stated above, our hypotheses and data are concerned with average interest rates
and average default levels, and hence the assumption is justified. If rent-seeking
leads to higher fixed investments and to ‘empire building’, the management still
has to ensure a positive price-cost margin. This can happen in two ways. Either
the management offers higher quality products to depositors and/or borrowers or
it is able to attract borrowers of lower-than-average risk. If management provides
higher quality products to depositors only, there is no correlation between our
measures of fixed investment and loan interest rates or default costs. If it offers
higher quality products to borrowers, this behavior is observationally indistin-
guishable from a profit maximization with fixed investments aimed at improving
the quality of the bank’s products. Finally, management may be able to attract
low-risk customers. One then has to explain how it is able to do this. If all banks
identify their customers by type, they face Bertrand competition with homogene-
ous goods, and rent-seeking will not result in breaking even. If a bank's manage-
ment is better at identifying low-risk customers than its rivals and makes fixed
investments, this is observationally equivalent to profit maximization with in-
vestment in monitoring. We would argue that if the only factors differentiating a
rent-seeking bank from other banks are fixed investments and either wider lending
margins or lower default rates and interest rates, then management is actually us-
ing fixed investments to generate one or the other of the two, ie it is behaving in
accord with our hypotheses.
Empirically, only a relatively small portion of these banks’ customers are
actually members of the cooperative.
20 Treating non-member customers as if the
bank was profit-maximizing seems a good first approximation. Secondly, these
banks seem to behave no differently toward their customers than other banks,
other than being more oriented toward small businesses. Finally, to the extent that
managerial rent-seeking at bank level is constant over our relatively short obser-
                                                
20 In 1998, less than 1/3 of the 2.1 million ‘active’ customers were members, despite strong growth
in the 1990s. The growth was due to active recruiting. The cooperative banks at aiming at 1 milli-
on members by 2002. Some 5% of members are firms or societies (eg sport clubs). The one-time
membership fee was no less than FIM 500 for 15% of the banks in 1992; currently, it is more than
that for 40% of the banks. We were told that there is wide variation between banks. Members have
received miscellaneous benefits, the economically most important probably being the right to buy
a ‘membership credit insurance policy’ for use as collateral. No clear policies have existed in
terms of giving members loans on more beneficial terms.22
vation period, we control for it in our econometric specification by controlling for
bank-specific nonobservables.
One could also claim that cooperative banks differ in other respects from
other banks. However, as long as such unobserved differences are not correlated
with fixed investment, FRQGLWLRQDORQDEDQNEHLQJDFRRSHUDWLYHEDQN, this is not
a problem. The reason for this relates to our sample selection strategy: By includ-
ing only cooperative banks in the sample, we condition out any permanent differ-
ences due to organizational form that do not vary between cooperative banks.
The final matter regarding the use of cooperative bank data is that these
banks do not necessarily make efficient use of their investments, which might
cause a spurious negative correlation between fixed investments and either inter-
est rates and/or default costs. We have four responses to this. Firstly, to the extent
that cooperative banks are uniformly inefficient, we control for this by looking
only at such banks. Secondly, if such inefficiencies vary over banks but are time-
invariant, we control for them through bank-specific effects. Thirdly, an unpub-
lished study on the cost-efficiency of Finnish cooperative banks (Linnosmaa
1993), indicates that inefficiencies are on average 20%, which does not differ
greatly from international estimates using data on SURILWPD[LPL]LQJ banks (eg
Allen and Anoop 1997). Fourthly, although Berger et al (1993) found that a bank’s
X-efficiency is size related, with small firms being less efficient, the banks in our
sample are all small banks as per their definition. Finally, we explicitly control for
inefficiency by using the standard measure: the ratio of non-interest expenses to
non-interest income.23
4  Empirical Model and Results
4.1  The Empirical Model
The empirical predictions of our theoretical model are expressed in propositions 3
and 4. Our models postulate two types of banks in a given banking market: those
that have made a fixed investment and those that have not. Fixed investments may
affect, firstly and most importantly for the empirics, the relative amount of de-
faults (negatively in the case of monitoring, not at all in the case of market power
investments), and secondly, the loan interest rate (negatively in the case of moni-
toring investments, positively in the case of market power investments). If a bank
is using its fixed investments for both purposes, their effect on interest rates de-
pends on the relative strengths of the two opposing effects. As market power has
no effect on default costs, we would expect a negative relationship between fixed
investments and default costs.
A central feature of our identification strategy is that our sample is special in
that the banks operate in a similar way, and that they operate in different, non-
overlapping markets. Our model predicts that in a given market there will be both
banks that invest in fixed costs and banks that do not. Our data (see table 1) sup-
ports the assumption that cooperative banks have made fixed investments. The
common ownership form and other shared features suggest that they use their fixed
investments for the same purpose(s), be it market power, information acquisition, or
something else. Having similar banks that operate in different markets enables us to
avoid having in the sample non-investing and investing banks, as well as investing
banks that use their investments for different purposes.
21 With our model, both of
these would be unavoidable if our data covered all banks in a given market.
First off, it would be interesting to compare investing banks (those in our sam-
ple) with non-investing banks. Unfortunately, no data is available on the competitor
banks at the level of disaggregation that would make such a comparison possible.
We estimate the following dynamic equations for defaults ('()LW) and loan
interest rates (,17/LW):
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where W = 1992, …,1996 and L = 1, …, 250. In these equations, the gMW (M = ',) are
time dummies, and nMLW are i.i.d. error terms. The time dummies should capture the
effects of any economy-wide shocks on loan pricing and defaults (especially im-
portant in the early years of our sample). The mML are firm-specific effects, possibly
correlated with explanatory variables, which control for bank- and market-specific
nonobservables. The most important market- (bank-) specific nonobservables are
the (average) riskiness of loan customers and the average expected value of their
                                                
21  Note that defining empirically a ‘non-investing’ bank is difficult, as any retail bank needs at
least one branch and some employees to be operative.24
projects, and (possibly) the scope for managerial rent-seeking. To the extent to
which behavioral patterns and competitive pressures of the rival banks are time-
invariant, mML controls also for the competitive situation of the market. As in the
company investment application of Bond and Meghir (1994), a further motivation
for including bank-specific effects is that our sample is non-random, as it includes
only cooperative banks. By allowing for such effects, we can to an extent control
for this particular persistent feature.
As to explanatory variables, the variable /2$1LW is included to control for
the size of a bank (its loan book). This is especially important because size may
allow a bank to 1) gain reductions in costs; 2) enjoy economies of scope, eg by
facilitating cross-selling of products; 3) better diversify its loan book; 4) achieve
lower funding costs (this we control also separately; see below); and 5) increase
the likelihood of a bailout by the cooperative banks’ security fund.
The once lagged endogenous variables are included to capture any adjust-
ment processes in banks’ pricing behavior and gradual realization of loan losses.
,1())LW (ratio of non-interest expenses to non-interest revenues) is included as a
summary variable to control for i) the (in)efficiency of management, ii) implicit
interest rates (possibly) charged in the form of fees on loans and commissions and
iii) income smoothing. As these (mixed) effects are all represented by ,1())LW,
and since this summary variable also probably proxies the extent to which banks
are engaged in other operations besides traditional loan business, its sign is not
predicted. The cost of funding, ,17'LW, (calculated as a weighted average of inter-
est rates on interbank borrowing and deposits) and the proxy for expected de-
faults, '()LW, are included in the interest rate equation and are predicted to have
positive coefficients. We do not model deposit-market related reasons for fixed
investments. ,17'LWcontrols for such effects where they exist. Our theoretical
model drives the inclusion of ,17/LW in the default equation, and its effect on de-
faults should be positive. The default equation also contains the SBF-dummy.
22
All variables are in logs, and since there are observations with zero values
for '()5LW, we use '()LW￿￿= ln(.000001+'()5LW). We experimented with different
definitions of '()LW(linear, ln(1+'()5LW)), and our results are robust in this sense.
The nominal values of variables are used.
23
4.2  Econometric Methods and Instruments
Because our econometric model is dynamic, we used the Generalized Method of
Moments (GMM) designed for dynamic panel data (Arellano and Bond 1991,
Blundell and Bond 1998, 1999) in our estimation.
24 We report two different GMM
                                                
22  The SBF-dummy was never significant in the interest rate equation and was therefore dropped.
The results are robust to its inclusion in the specification.
23 The reason for using nominal values is that i) it is not clear what deflator to use (eg real estate
values both declined and increased during the observation period), ii) inflation was very low du-
ring the (short) observation period. We did however estimate the base specification with variables
deflated by the consumer price index and the cost of living index and got the same results.
24 Estimating a static model with Error Component 2SLS (Baltagi 1981) produced similar results,
but autocorrelation tests on the estimated residual gave mixed results. It should however be noted
that these estimations were based on a set of covariance restrictions that were somewhat stronger
than the ones adopted in this paper. These exogeneity restrictions were made to obtain valid in-
struments, and we did not test for their validity in that framework.25
estimates: ‘GMM DIF’ is the Arellano-Bond (1991) estimator, and ‘GMM SYS’
the Blundell and Bond (1998; see also Arellano and Bover 1995) estimator. The
first estimator uses on levels (at lags 2 or more) of the endogenous explanatory
variables as instruments in first-differenced equations. For predetermined vari-
ables, the lag 1 levels are also valid instruments. The second estimator utilizes the
assumption that the differences in the explanatory variables are uncorrelated with
the firm-specific effect (and a further initial condition assumption). This allows
the use of suitable lagged first differences as instruments for the equations in lev-
els. It has been shown (Blundell and Bond 1998, 1999) both in Monte Carlo stud-
ies and empirically that especially when the levels are weak instruments for the
first differenced variables, considerable efficiency gains and avoidance of finite
sample bias can be achieved by adding these extra moment conditions. Such a
situation may arise especially when the time series are persistent. This is the case
for a number of variables in our data, particularly for 3(56LW, %5$LW and /2$1LW.
In the GMM DIF estimations of the default and loan interest rate equations,
we have i) allowed for the fact that the lagged dependent variable is necessarily
correlated with the bank-specific effects and ii) assumed that the levels of any
other explanatory variable are potentially correlated with the bank-specific effects.
In the default equation, the lagged dependent variable and /2$1LW are potentially
correlated with n’LW, ie endogenous. Since '()LW represents realized loan defaults,
the other explanatory variables in this equation are assumed to be predetermined
w.r.t. n’LW. For the loan interest rate equation, a more conservative approach was
adopted in that all the explanatory variables are treated as endogenous. Based on
this classification, the instruments used for GMM DIF are thus the observations
on explanatory variables datedW-2 or earlier if the variable is endogenous and W-1
or earlier if it is predetermined.
In the GMM SYS estimations, we initially assumed that the differences of
all explanatory variables in both interest rate and default equations are uncorre-
lated with the bank-specific effects and specifically that the deviations of the ini-
tial conditions from the (long-run) mean of the process are uncorrelated with the
mean itself (Blundell and Bond 1998, 1999). The instruments used in the levels
equations are the observations on the differenced explanatory variables dated W-1
(eg D[W-￿) if the variable is endogenous and W if it is predetermined.
The first observation of our sample is however special. On the one hand, in
1992 the banking crisis was at its worst, with eg defaults for the whole Finnish
banking sector reaching their peak (during that year, 4.8% of loans were written
off; see Davis 1995). On the other hand, the process of dismantling the SBF bank
took place in 1992 and 1993. Interestingly, the default costs for our sample were
at their lowest in 1992, relative to loans extended, which also were at their mini-
mum. This casts doubts on the validity of the initial conditions restrictions, at least
for the '()LW and /2$16LW variables. Indeed, when we tested for all the additional
moment conditions used in the levels equations, a difference-Sargan statistic re-
jected their validity at the 1% level (p-value .0083) in the interest rate equation
and resulted in a p-value of .105 in the default equation. There are reasons to sus-
pect that D/2$1L￿W-￿ and D'()L￿W-￿ are the driving forces behind the rejection (and
the marginality of validity). As a matter of fact, the validity of the additional mo-
ment conditions used in the levels equations is not rejected when both D/2$1L￿W-￿
and D'()L￿W-￿ are dropped from the instrument set (the p-values for difference-
Sargan tests are .211 and .239 in the default and interest rate equations, respec-
tively). We therefore decided to err on the conservative side and excluded them
from the instrument set of both equations in the estimations that follow.26
4.3  Empirical Results
The results to be reported are based on one-step GMM estimators.
25 The asymp-
totic variance matrix for these is more reliable than for the two-step GMM (see eg
Blundell and Bond 1998).
4.3.1  Interest Rate Equation
The interest rate estimation results are presented in table 4. Comparing first the co-
efficients of the lagged dependent variable, we observe that the OLS coefficient
(column 1) is the largest, the within-groups coefficient (column 2) the smallest, and
the GMM estimates (GMM DIF in column 3, GMM SYS in 4) are in between the
others.
26 These follow closely the expected pattern and that reported by Blundell
and Bond (1999) in their production function and Monte Carlo studies. Turning to
the other parameters, the OLS and within-group estimates differ (sometimes sub-
stantially) from the GMM estimates. The GMM DIF and GMM SYS estimates are
reasonably close to each other, but the latter seem to be more efficient, as expected.
Focusing on the GMM SYS estimates of our base specification (column 4), we find
that expected default costs ('()LW) do not affect interest rates but that interest rate
costs (,17'LW) have a positive effect. The long-run cost-of-financing elasticity of
loan interest rates is .148. The coefficient of loan book size (/2$1LW) is positive and
has a p-value of 0.09. The summary variable ,1())LW obtained a negative and sig-
nificant coefficient. The variables of greatest interest, %5$LW and 3(56LW, both carry
negative and significant coefficients, implying that banks with larger branch net-
works and more human capital at branch level charge lower interest rates. These
results are in line with the information acquisition model, and reject the market
power model and naturally thereby also the possibility that banks use their fixed
investments for both market power and information acquisition.
27 The estimated
elasticities for %5$LW and 3(56LW are small, which indicates that the costs of infor-
mation acquisition in terms of having to offer lower interest rates to attract those
customers the bank has identified as ‘good’ are low.
Turning to the test statistics, the first differenced residuals display first order
autocorrelation, as expected, and no second order autocorrelation. The Sargan tests
do not reject the overidentifying restrictions in the GMM DIF or GMM SYS esti-
mations. A Wald statistic testing the joint significance of %5$LW and 3(56LWrejects
the null hypothesis of their coefficients not being jointly different from zero.
                                                
25 The estimates have been produced using Arellano-Bond DPD98, kindly provided by Steve
Bond. For reference, we also report OLS and within-group estimates. The consistency of these two
estimators requires that all explanatory variables be strictly exogenous w.r.t. nMLW.
26 Note that the number of observations varies over estimation methods as GMM DIF loses one
year (cross-section) due to lag construction and a second year due to first-differencing. GMM SYS
loses only one cross-section.
27 At the very minimum, it is the case that information acquisition strongly dominates any market
power use of fixed investments. It is worth noting that the within-group estimate produces positive
and significant coefficients for %5$ and 3(56 (OLS for 3(56), which would support the market
power hypothesis and reject the information acquisition hypothesis. We have however tested the
null hypothesis of %5$ and 3(56 being predetermined against the alternative of theie being endo-
genous. Using a difference Sargan test, we rejected the null at the 5% level (p-value .034). Based
on this, the consistency of OLS and within-group estimators can be questioned.27













































































































































DENS - - - - - - -.0844
(.0384)
-
EDUC - - - - - - .0483
(.0199)
-
OWNH - - - - - - .0998
(.0790)
-
UE - - - - - - - -.0342
(.0330)
WCAP - - - - - - - -.0011
(.0173)
AGRIC - - - - - - - -.0123
(.0082)
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NOTES: All GMM estimates are one-step. Numbers reported are coefficient and asymptotic stan-
dard errors (s.e.). Reported standard errors are robust to general cross-section and time-series hete-
roscedasticity. Nobs is the number of useable observations. All estimations include time dummies.
- Sargan is a test of the overidentifying restrictions for the GMM estimators. Reported numbers are
p-values.
- m1 and m2 are tests for 1
st and 2
nd order autocorrelation in the first differenced residuals (except
for OLS and within-group estimations, for which the tests are for levels residuals); they are as-
ymptotically distributed N(0,1); (p-values)
- Wald1 = Wald test of joint significance of explanatory variables (p-value)
- Wald2 = Wald test of joint significance of time dummies (p-value)
- Wald3 = Wald test of joint significance of BRA and PERS terms (p-value)28
5REXVWQHVVWHVWV
We conducted a number of robustness tests. Firstly, as the time period covered by
our data starts with a recession and ends with a period of strong growth, we tested
our coefficients for stability over time. This was done by introducing an indicator
variable for the years 95-96 (years of positive GDP growth) and interacted it with
other variables. We could not reject the null that the coefficients are stable over
time (p-value .137). Secondly, as the banks differ substantially in size, we tested
whether our coefficients for central variables, ie %5$LW3(56LW,17/L￿W￿1 and '(
)LW, are sensitive to the size of the banks. We introduced an indicator variable that
took the value unity if the sum of /2$1LW and interbank lending (eg total loans)
was above mean (and as an alternative, median) and zero otherwise, and inter-
acted it with the aforementioned variables. Again, the null hypothesis could not be
rejected at conventional levels (p-value .270). Thirdly, earlier literature (Fama
1985 and Vale 1993 in particular) has suggested that banks can use deposits to
monitor their loan customers’ cash flows and thereby gain information on the
riskiness of loans. We tested whether this affects loan interest rates by including
the variable 5'(3LW, defined as the ratio of deposits made by customers to the sum
of customer deposits and interbank borrowing. Treating 5'(3LW as endogenous,
we find that it has no effect on bank’s loan interest rates. Fourthly, notwithstand-
ing our arguments favoring a geography-based definition of the branch variable,
we estimated the model using the number of branches divided by population.
These estimations can be found in appendix 4 and verify our main results. Finally,
one could argue that the effect of fixed investments, especially that of 3(56LW is
nonlinear. We thus re-estimated the model including the squared (log of) 3(56LW
(see appendix 4). Again, our results are confirmed as both the linear and the
squared 3(56LW terms obtain negative coefficients, with the former being statisti-
cally significant.
The estimates using the whole panel do not include exogenous variables, as
market characteristics are currently available only up to 1995. Thus column 6 re-
produces the estimation of column 4 (GMM SYS), using 1992 - 1995 data. As the
column reveals, our results are robust to exclusion of 1996, a year of strong eco-
nomic growth. In columns 7 and 8 we add different market characteristics to the
model. In these exercises, market level variables are treated as strictly exogenous
(and they are only used to instrument themselves). Adding a group of demo-
graphic variables (population density '(16LW￿ see table 3 for definitions), educa-
tion (('8&LW) and home ownership (2:1+LW)) leads to higher absolute values for
the %5$LW and 3(56LW coefficients. Two of the three market characteristics obtain
statistically significant coefficients. Adding controls for unemployment (8(LW),
wealth per capita (:&$3LW) and agriculture ($*5,&LW) causes 3(56LWto become
insignificant, and %5$LWis only marginally significant. However, none of these
three controls gets a statistically significant coefficient. We conclude that our re-
sults for the negative effects of branch network density and bank human capital on
loan interest rates are robust.
To further address the issue of a potentially spurious relationship between
our measures of fixed investment and dependent variable(s) due to agriculture, we
introduced two further controls: the number of farms in the market, and the aver-
age size of a farm. Using all three agricultural controls showed that although they
rendered both 3(56LW￿ and %5$LWinsignificant, the controls were jointly highly
insignificant (p-value 0.724). Introducing them individually showed that $*5,&LW
is the one that affects our measures of fixed investments, albeit its coefficient was
very imprecisely measured (p-value 0.361). With the two other controls, at least29
the coefficient of %5$LWremained significant. One should also keep in mind that
the level of agricultural activity over our relatively short observation period is
largely constant, and therefore controlled by the market- (bank-) specific effect.
We conclude that our results are not due to spurious correlation between our
measures of fixed investment and agricultural loans (see also the robustness tests
pertaining to the estimated default equation).
4.3.2  Default Equation
Turning now to the results for the default equation in table 5 (column order as in
table 4), we find that the coefficients of the lagged dependent variable generated
by different estimation methods follow the expected pattern, with the GMM SYS
estimate being 0.19. Again concentrating on the GMM SYS estimates (base speci-
fication in column 4), we find first of all that an increase in the loan interest rate
(,17/LW) increases the amount of defaults significantly (long-run interest rate elas-
ticity of defaults 8.126). This is in line with our (and other) theoretical models.
Even after controlling for this effect, banks with larger loan books have larger
relative default costs. This could reflect the specificity of our sample period and
more careful choice of customers on the part of small banks. However, it is also
possible that the result is not period-specific. This implies that, conditional on the
level of fixed investment, a larger loan book (implying a greater number of loans
extended) leads to larger default costs. Decreasing returns to scale in the informa-
tion acquisition technology would lead to this result. The summary variable ,1
())LW has no effect on default costs, but we find that banks into which former
savings banks’ branches have been merged have lower loan losses. A possible
explanation for this is that only the healthier cooperative banks (SBF dismantle-
ment occurred in 1992 - 1993, in the midst of the banking crisis) were willing (or
allowed by the government) to take on former savings bank branches. Also, as a
part of SBF dismantlement, the worst loans were transferred to a government-run
asset management company while the buying banks took on their books only
loans that were considered healthy. Most significantly, we find that both variables
capturing fixed costs have significant negative effects on defaults, which supports
the information acquisition hypothesis.
The estimated long-run elasticities are –2.15 for branch density and –4.08
for personnel costs. These results reject the market power model (as well as the
managerial rents hypotheses).
Turning briefly to the test statistics, these are similar to those of the interest
rate equation. In particular, the Sargan tests do not reject the overidentifying re-
strictions in the GMM DIF or GMM SYS estimations and a Wald statistic rejects
the null of %5$LW and 3(56LW being not jointly different from zero.30











































































































































DENS - - - - - - -2.8371
(1.6670)
-
EDUC - - - - - - .9744
(.9063)
-
OWNH - - - - - - 7.0733
(3.3794)
-
UE - - - - - - - .1693
(1.3596)
W C A P - - ----- 1 . 5 1 4 5
(.8060)
AGRIC - - - - - - - .4435
(.3559)
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NOTES: All GMM estimates are one-step. Numbers reported are coefficient and asymptotic standard
errors (s.e.). Reported standard errors are robust to general cross-section and time-series heterosce-
dasticity. Nobs is the number of useable observations. All estimations include time dummies.
- Sargan is a test of the overidentifying restrictions for the GMM estimators. Reported numbers are
p-values.
- m1 and m2 are tests for 1
st and 2
nd order autocorrelation in the first differenced residuals (except
for OLS and within-group estimations, for which the tests are for levels residuals); they are asymp-
totically distributed N(0,1); (p-values)
- Wald1 = Wald test of joint significance of explanatory variables (p-value)
- Wald2 = Wald test of joint significance of time dummies (p-value)
- Wald3 = Wald test of joint significance of BRA and PERS terms (p-value)31
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We conducted the same robustness tests as with the interest rate equation and the
results were similar, with one exception. The 5'(3LW variable (see column 5) ob-
tained a negative and significant coefficient (-8.34) when added to the specifica-
tion and treated as being endogenous and correlated in levels with the bank-
specific effects. This provides evidence that banks can indeed use information
obtained from monitoring customers’ cash flows to reduce loan losses. Concur-
rently and independently, Mester et al (1998) obtained a similar result using data
on US checking accounts. Adding 5'(3LW reduces the absolute size of the %5$LW
and 3(56LW coefficients to -0.91 and –2.38, respectively. They do remain statisti-
cally significant, however.
Excluding the 1996 data does not materially affect the results (column 6).
Adding exogenous control variables to the specification changes slightly the %5$LW
and  3(56LW coefficients. However, only two of the six exogenous regressors
(2:1+LW and $*5,&LW respectively in columns 7 and 8) obtain statistically signifi-
cant coefficients. Adding '(16LW('8&LW and 2:1+LW renders the %5$LWcoeffi-
cient significant at only the 12% level; %5$LW and 3(56LW are still jointly signifi-
cant. Adding 8(LW:&$3LW and $*5,&LW results in an insignificant %5$LW coeffi-
cient, but %5$LW and 3(56LW are still jointly significant.
As with the interest rate equation, we conducted separate tests to check for
the effects of agriculture on defaults. %5$LW and 3(56LW remained jointly signifi-
cant (though only 3(56LW individually) when we included all three controls. They
were jointly and individually insignificant (p-value of joint significance 0.432).
Introducing the controls individually, we found that only when the number of
farms was introduced was it not the case the both %5$LW and 3(56LW obtained sig-
nificant coefficients and, even then, they were jointly significant (though only
3(56LW individually). The level of agricultural activity (proxy for the level of agri-
cultural loans) thus does not cause a spurious correlation between defaults and our
measures of fixed investment.
As a last robustness check, we tested whether future default costs (above
and beyond one year) are affected by current values of %5$LWand 3(56LW. The aim
is to control for the definition of '()LW￿ which is calculated using net writeoffs
(default costs) for the current period, in line with our theoretical model. However,
banks in fact incur default costs from loans made in earlier periods, since it takes
time before loan risks are realized and loans are written off. The assumption in
our monitoring model is that fixed costs are investments that improve a bank’s
ability to ex ante identify projects with small liquidation costs and/or high resale
value. It could be that fixed costs are instead used to improve banks’ interim and
ex post monitoring ability (costly state verification). To some extent, we control
for this in all estimations by using the number of branches at the start of the year
in computing %5$LW. One could however argue that if only current levels of %5$LW
and 3(56LW (as defined) affected '()LW negatively, it would not be clear which of
the two phenomena generates the results. Finding that lagged values of %5$ and
3(56 affect current values of '()LW negatively would provide additional support
for our assumption of ex ante monitoring.
The results of the estimations are reported in table 6, where we have used
the GMM SYS estimator and the same instruments as above. The first column
reproduces our base specification on 1992–1996 data. Column 2 replaces the cur-
rent values of %5$LW and 3(56LW with once lagged values (%5$L￿W￿1 and 3(56L￿W￿1). In
column 3, %5$LW and 3(56LW have been lagged two years, and column 4 reflects a
specification with both current and once lagged values of %5$ and 3(56. The32
idea behind including them is that in any given year, '()LW consists of defaulted
loans extended in different years. As the relationship between these explanatory
variables and '()LWcould well be nonlinear, and because the current and lagged
levels of %5$LW and 3(56LW are fairly strongly autocorrelated, we experimented
with inclusion of the squared logs of lagged %5$ and 3(56 (column 5).
Using the once lagged values, we find that both %5$L￿W￿1 and 3(56L￿W￿1 carry
imprecisely measured negative coefficients. The S-value of a test of joint signifi-
cance is 0.138. Lagging the variables twice results in negative coefficients; that of
%5$L￿W￿2 is significant, and they are also jointly significant. In column 4 we find
that the current values of %5$LW and 3(56LW obtain negative and significant coeffi-
cients, and lagged values positive and insignificant coefficients. Column 5 shows
that both current values and the lagged squared values of 3(56 carry negative and
significant coefficients. The coefficient of lagged squared %5$ is positive but in-
significant. Though not as strong as those reported in table 5, these results support
the assumption of out theoretical model that fixed costs contribute to the ex ante
information acquisition ability of banks.33
7DEOH Default cost estimations (1992–1996) with
lagged BRA and PERS
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NOTES: NOTES: All GMM estimates are one-step. Numbers reported are coefficient and
asymptotic standard errors (s.e.). Reported standard errors are robust to general cross-section and
time-series heteroscedasticity. Nobs is the number of useable observations. All estimations in-
clude the SBF dummy;
- Sargan is a test of the overidentifying restrictions for the GMM estimators. Reported numbers
are p-values.
- m1 and m2 are tests for 1
st and 2
nd order autocorrelation in the first differenced residuals (ex-
cept for OLS and within-group estimations, for which the tests are for levels residuals); they are
asymptotically distributed N(0,1); (p-values)
- Wald1 = Wald test of joint significance of explanatory variables (p-value)
- Wald2 = Wald test of joint significance of time dummies (p-value)
- Wald3 = a Wald test of joint significance of all BRAs and PERSs, including lagged ones, in the
equation (p-value).34
5  Conclusions
The main objective of this paper was to shed light on whether banks use their
fixed investments for information acquisition or obtaining market power. Our
theoretical model allows us to study such investments within a common modeling
framework. Different types of fixed investments have very different empirical
implications. Our main interest was on the effects of fixed investment on banks’
lending quality and the interest rate charged by the bank. Our theoretical predic-
tion is that information acquisition leads to a lower amount of defaults and a lower
interest rate margin. Market power investments, in contrast, have no direct effect
on default costs (an indirect positive effect through the interest rate) and lead to
higher interest rates.
We tested these theories using panel data covering 250 Finnish local banks
over a five-year period. The fact that these banks operate in non-overlapping re-
gional markets means that the equilibrium level of investments varies over banks,
thus allowing us to identify the effects of fixed investment on bank performance.
The non-random nature of the sample and the shared features and institutions of
the cooperative banks allowed us to assume that they use their fixed investments
for the same purpose. This also enabled us to avoid the problem (predicted by our
theory) of having both investing and non-investing banks in our sample.
We found persistence in both loan interest rates and default costs. Loan in-
terest rates are an increasing function of deposit interest rates. Unsurprisingly,
higher interest rates increase default costs. Banks with larger loan books have
higher (relative) default costs. We found that banks’ investments in both branch
network density and human capital (personnel) contribute to the information ac-
quisition ability of banks, as both loan interest rates and default costs are de-
creasing in these variables. In addition, we find evidence supporting the hypothe-
sis (Fama 1985) that banks use deposits to monitor customers' cash flows and are
thereby able to reduce the amount of loan losses. These results were robust to a
number of experiments. In particular, we found that lagged values of branch net-
work density and personnel have a similar effect on current default costs. These
findings support the assumption of our theoretical model that banks use fixed in-
vestments for ex ante information acquisition, rather than for ex post monitoring.35
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Appendix 1. 
3522)2)352326,7,21 3$57D To begin with, note that the no-
cross-substitution assumption implies that 
0
) ( , S Y S 0 5 5 ³  holds for  {} % * S , Î .
Then, for a Stackelberg solution, consider the follower. Whenever feasible, the
non-monitoring follower will optimally undercut either both offers or the higher
offer of the leader, depending on which action yields higher profits. If this strat-
egy is not feasible, the follower tries to at least match one of the offers so as to
split the entrepreneurs in this category, just to remain in business. We can now
turn to the leader’s strategy:
&ODLP. The monitoring leader cannot earn strictly positive expected profits from
both entrepreneur categories in equilibrium.
To prove the claim (by contradiction), suppose that the opposite holds. Then it
must be the case that 
0
) ( , S Y S 0 5 5 >  holds for  {} % * S , Î . But for any such interest
rate pair, the follower will optimally undercut either both offers or the higher of-
fer, depending on which action yields higher profits and capture all the entrepre-
neurs or those to whom the higher rate was quoted, thus contradicting the as-
sumption. Only when 
0
) ( , *% Y * 0 5 5 £  and 
0
) ( , % Y % 0 5 5 =  does there not exist any
such strictly profitable undercutting opportunity for the non-monitoring follower.
To see this, note that should the follower undercut either loan rate, it would make
non-positive expected profits. In this case, however, zero-profits are earned by the
leader from the customers labeled bad, which again contradicts the assumption.
Thus claim 1 holds.
The implication of the above is that the optimal strategy of the monitoring
leader involves pricing to maximize profits from the borrower class from which it
can potentially earn strictly positive profits. Given the undercutting option of the
follower, the leader can compute and announce an indifference rate at which the
follower is indifferent between trying to become the sole financier of *% (by un-
dercutting both of the leader's offers) and financing solely those entrepreneurs to
whom the leader quotes a higher interest rate. Consider a strategy where such an
indifference rate, 
LQG
S 5  , is quoted for the class {} % * S , Î  and where the other
category, S´ ¹ S is priced out, ie ‘rationed’ by quoting an interest rate that is
strictly higher than the monopoly rate, 
* 5 . If such an interest rate pair were ob-
served by the follower, its optimal response would be to quote 
* 5 510 = , since
by construction it has no profit incentive to undercut the offer made by the leader
for S. The follower would end up financing category S at rate 
* 5 . This implies
that if the category to which QR interest rate is quoted by the leader is % (ie if S =
%), the indifference rate, 
LQG
* 5  (quoted for the good by the monitoring leader) is
found by solving the equation
)) ( , ( ) 1 ( ) exp( 1 ))( ( ) ( (
* % Y 5 5 *% Y [ (
LQG
* p r l = + - - - - (1.1)
( ) ) 1 ( )) ( / ˆ 1 ))( ( ) ( ( )) ~ ( 1 ( )) ( , (   where
* r p + - - - - = [ ( : % Y [ ( Y * % Y 5  is positive by
inequality (5) of the main text.39
Alternatively, if S = *, the relevant indifference rate, 
LQG
% 5  , is solved from
the equation
)) ( , ( ) 1 ( ) exp( 1 ))( ( ) ( (
* * Y 5 5 *% Y [ (
LQG
% p r l = + - - - - (1.2)
( ) ) 1 ( )) ( / ˆ 1 ))( ( ) ( ( ) ~ ( )) ( , (   where
* r p + - - - = [ ( : * Y [ ( Y * * Y 5  > 0. In the above
equations, )) ( , (   and   )) ( , (
* * * Y 5 % Y 5 p p  are the expected profits for the follower
from cases S = % and S = *, respectively.
Since banks’ expected profits are increasing in the loan interest rate within
any given entrepreneur class, in either case the monitoring leader’s profit from S
is the higher, the higher the indifference interest rate at which it provides financ-
ing for S . The observation that the indifference interest rates are the higher, the
higher the expected profits of the follower from cases S = % and S = *, allows us
to write
&ODLP It is optimal for the monitoring leader to price out S , since this maxi-
mizes the follower’s profit from this entrepreneur class and hence also the associ-
ated indifference interest rate that the monitoring bank can charge S.
Note in particular, that if the leader were to quote the monopoly interest rate for
class S, the associated indifference interest rate would be strictly lower than it
would be if a marginally higher interest rate were quoted.
&ODLP The optimal pricing by the monitoring leader involves pricing out bad
entrepreneurs (S= %) and quoting the indifference rate defined by equation (1.1)
for good entrepreneurs (S = *). The best response by the follower to such an in-
terest rate schedule is to quote the monopoly interest rate.
To prove the claim, note that the expected profits for the monitoring leader for the
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Since Y is uniformly distributed, it is easy to verify that
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and then that
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Since the best response by the follower to 
LQG
* 5  is to quote the monopoly rate,
claim 3 follows.
Thus, in equilibrium, the leader ends up financing entrepreneurs it classified
good at the indifference rate defined in (1.1) whereas the follower provides fi-
nancing at the monopoly rate for entrepreneurs classified bad by the monitoring40
leader. The expected profits are  )) ( , ( * Y 5
LQG
* p  and    )) ( , (
* % Y 5 p for the monitoring
leader and non-monitoring follower, respectively. This completes the proof of part
(a) of proposition 1.  4('
3522)2)352326,7,21 3$57E Recall that the no-cross-substitution
assumption implies that 
0
) ( , % Y % 0 5 5 ³ . We begin by claiming that the non-
monitoring leader cannot announce an interest rate (strictly) below 
0
) (% Y 5 . To
prove this,suppose the non-monitoring leader were to offer an interest rate mar-
ginally below 
0
) (% Y 5 . The follower’s best response would clearly be to offer ex-
actly the same interest rate for all good entrepreneurs and any rate higher than or
equal to
0
) (% Y 5  to those it labeled bad. From this and assumption A3, it follows that
all the good entrepreneurs (in class *) will prefer the monitoring follower to the
leader. This means that at any rate below 
0
) (% Y 5  the leader finances only those al-
located to % by the monitoring bank at an interest rate implying negative expected
profits for it. Hence the claim must hold in equilibrium.
Note that if the non-monitoring leader tried to set an interest rate higher than
0
) (% Y 5  it would provide an incentive for the follower to undercut the offer and thus
the leader would end up funding no entrepreneurs. From this it follows that the
leader cannot do better than to offer 
0
) (% Y 10 5 5 = . The optimal strategy for the
follower is then to charge the very same interest rate to all the entrepreneurs,
namely 
0
) ( , , % Y % 0 * 0 5 5 5 = = . This implies that 
0
) (% Y 5  is quoted by both banks and
to each entrepreneur category in equilibrium and that % is split between the two
banks, whereas the monitoring leader finances *. It follows that both banks earn
zero expected profits from lending to % while the monitoring bank earns positive
profits from lending to *, ie  0 )) ( , (
0
) ( > * Y 5 % Y p .  4('41
Appendix 2. 
7+(352'8&7',))(5(17,$7,2102'(/ In the following we present
the details of the product differentiation model. The fixed investment changes the
way loan customers perceive the services provided by a banking firm. Both for
simplicity and comparability with the monitoring model, we let the quality and
availability of services of a bank, VL, be a dichotomous variable, with  {} 1 , 0 Î L V .
The cost of this investment is fixed, 6> 0. None of the results in this section are
due to the constrained choice set that the banks face but rather can also be derived
for a continuous quality variable.
For comparability, the timing of events is the same as in the monitoring
model. Banks enter simultaneously and decide VL in stage one. In the second stage,
the leader-follower roles are randomly determined, and conditional on their reali-
zation, the banks compete in interest rates sequentially.
We next derive Nash equilibrium loan pricing strategies of banks as a func-
tion of service quality investments and conditional on realization of the leader-
follower roles. Finally, we find the sub-game perfect quality investments.
/RDQ3ULFLQJ8QGHU6\PPHWULF4XDOLW\,QYHVWPHQWVSince in this sec-
tion no monitoring is involved, the banks can observe neither Y nor q characteriz-
ing the entrepreneurs and each bank can quote only one interest rate, which will
apply to all entrepreneurs. It follows that if both ( 1 = = M L V V ) or neither
( 0 = = M L V V ) of the banks have made the fixed quality investment, there is no dif-
ference in customers’ quality perceptions. Given the realization of the leader-
follower roles, the analysis then corresponds to the case of standard Stackelberg-
competition with identical firms and homogeneous goods. By the standard under-
cutting argument, banks charge the zero-profit interest rate 
0
) (*% Y 5  in equilibrium.
/RDQ 3ULFLQJ 8QGHU $V\PPHWULF 4XDOLW\ ,QYHVWPHQWV In this sub-
section, we consider the asymmetric case in which only one bank has made the
quality related fixed investment (eg  0 = L V  and  1 = M V ). To begin with, let 5+ and
5/ denote the rates charged by the high-quality (H-bank) and low-quality bank (L-
bank), respectively. An entrepreneur with characteristics (Yq) patronizing the H-
bank has expected utility
q m + ) ( + 5 (2.1)
where 
+ 5
+ H [ ( 5
l m
- = ) ( ) ( . Given the normalization of the quality variable, the
expected utility for customers of the L-bank is simply 
/ 5
/ H [ ( 5
l m
- = ) ( ) (  A mar-
ginal entrepreneur type (q
￿), who is indifferent between patronizing the two
banks, is given by
) ( ) (
*
+ / 5 5 m m q - º (2.2)
For the L-bank to attract any customers,  + / 5 5 <  must hold. Since q~ U[0,q ],
the demands that the banks face are  q q
* 1 ) , ( - = / + + 5 5 '  and
q q
* ) , ( = / + / 5 5 '  for the H-bank and L-bank, respectively.42
Bank L¶sexpected profits are given by
( ) ) 1 ( ) 1 ))( ( ) ( ( ) , ( )) ( , ( r p
l + - - - =
- L 5
M L L L H *% Y [ ( 5 5 ' *% Y 5 (2.3)
where L=+/L ¹ M.
Due to the assumed sequential structure in interest rate setting, we have two
asymmetric cases to consider: the cases of H-bank as leader and follower. The
derivation of the Nash equilibrium loan rates is standard, ie one first solves the
follower’s problem as a function of the leader’s interest rate and then utilizes the
derived best response function in solving the leader’s maximization problem. We
omit the details for brevity and present directly
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The equilibrium demands were found by computing the identity of the marginal
type at the equilibrium interest rates.
To check that banks earn positive expected profits in equilibrium, we use
the equilibrium interest rates and demands to find that the profits for part (a) are43
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and for part (b)
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*% Y 5/ (2.7)
7KH 4XDOLW\ ,QYHVWPHQW The analysis of the first stage of the vertical
product differentiation game closely parallels that of the monitoring game. The
expected profits of each bank under asymmetric quality investments are
0 )) ( , ( )) ( , ( ) 1 , 0 ( ) 0 , 1 ( 2
1
2
1 > + º = *% Y 5 *% Y 5 + + M L p p p p (2.8)
0 )) ( , ( )) ( , ( ) 0 , 1 ( ) 1 , 0 ( 2
1
2
1 > + º = *% Y 5 *% Y 5 / / M L p p p p (2.9)
Taking into account the fixed quality cost, we can summarize the expected profits
in payoff matrix A2.1:
3D\RII0DWUL[$ Expected equilibrium profits for quality choice outcomes.
VM = 0 VM = 1
VL = 0 0,0 ) ) 1 , 0 ( ( ), 1 , 0 ( 6 M L - p p
VL = 1 ) 0 , 1 ( ), ) 0 , 1 ( ( M L 6 p p - 0,0
We again assume that the fixed investment generating customer services is feasi-
ble, ie that its fixed cost, 6 is low enough to induce one bank to invest in quality.
Because the two banks want to avoid entering price competition in Bertrand
fashion in homogeneous goods, it is easy, using the payoff matrix, to verify that
with simultaneous entry the following obtains:
3URSRVLWLRQ$7KHYHUWLFDOSURGXFWGLIIHUHQWLDWLRQPRGHOKDVWZRDV\PPHWULF
VXEJDPHSHUIHFWHTXLOLEULDLQZKLFKRQO\RQHEDQNLQYHVWVLQTXDOLW\
As in the monitoring model, had we allowed for sequential entry, a threshold
could be derived that determines whether the bank entering first invests in quality.
We can now turn to the empirical predictions of the market power version of
our model. As in the information acquisition version, the equilibrium structure of
a given banking market is asymmetric with one bank investing in high(er) loan
customer convenience. By proposition A2.1, the H-bank on average ends up ex-
tending more loans and financing entrepreneurs at a higher interest rate than the
L-bank. Since the average Y in the loan portfolios of both banks is Y(*%), ex-44
pected bankruptcy costs (relative loan losses) are identical for the two banks, DIWHU
controlling for interest rates. Let us collect these empirical predictions into
&RUROODU\ $ 7KH +EDQN FKDUJHV KLJKHU LQWHUHVW UDWHV DQG H[WHQGV PRUH
ORDQVWKDQWKH/EDQN&RQGLWLRQDORQLQWHUHVWUDWHVFKDUJHGERWKEDQNVIDFH
LGHQWLFDOORDQORVVHVUHODWLYHWRWKHDPRXQWRIORDQVH[WHQGHG
Proposition 4 of the main text sums up propositions A2.1 and A2.2 as well as cor-
ollary A2.1.45
Appendix 3. 
<($5:,6('(6&5,37,9(67$7,67,&6 In table A.3.1. we report mean,
median, standard deviation, and minimum and maximum value for each year and
variable. All figures are in FIM in nominal terms.
The mean amount of loans extended was lowest in 1992 and increased
thereafter. The same applies for deposits. All four interest rates (loan, interbank
loan, deposit, and interbank deposit) decrease each year. The mean loan interest
rate goes from 12.03% in 1992 to 7.39% in 1996. Our calculated cost of funds
(,17') decreases from 7.43% to 2.49%. Interestingly, and contradicting industry
figures, the default costs bottomed in 1992; default costs for the whole banking
industry peaked in that year. At their highest (in 1994), the mean default costs
were 1.77% of loans extended. This however masks wide bank-level variation.
For each year, some banks reported zero default costs. At the same time, the
maximum default costs vary between 8.65% (in 1996) and 17.05% (in 1993) of
loans extended.
During the observation period, banks’ branch networks and numbers of em-
ployees were changing. The cooperative banks are generally felt to have been the
slowest to make such adjustments, and our numbers bear that out. The mean num-
ber of branches declines from 3.6 in 1992 to 2.9 in 1996, but first increases in the
interim. Personnel costs are very stable, with a mean of some FIM 5.5 million.
Unsurprisingly therefore, personnel costs per branch exhibit an increasing trend.
Checking the year-wise minima and maxima for each bank-level variable
revealed no outliers in the sense that the year-to-year changes were roughly pro-
portional to the changes in sample first moments. The only extreme value that
changes markedly is that of ,1()): whereas the sample moments are stable, the
maximum decreases from 3.09 in 1993 to 1.52 in 1994. Sample second moments
of all bank-level variables are remarkably stable over the observation period, es-
pecially in light of the changing macroeconomic conditions.46
7DEOH$ Yearly descriptive statistics of bank variables
Year Mean Med. S.d. Min. Max.
Deposits, FIM million
1992 241.5775 123.641 384.2059 11.0846 2969.309
1993 258.4518 131.3481 416.6836 12.6948 3244.395
1994 314.6419 159.4877 524.9837 13.6927 4194.973
1995 324.3661 162.7845 535.9779 13.8813 4226.674
1996 328.7691 160.7896 544.3834 14.1277 4285.681
LOAN
1992 242.4031 108.1146 439.4923 6.3583 3296.819
1993 247.7302 111.2777 451.8151 7.0851 3358.258
1994 275.5024 122.9388 515.3931 7.8430 3875.546
1995 264.1695 119.7953 485.1355 7.7068 3734.778
1996 262.5445 119.4842 481.9306 7.2394 3800.051
Deposit interest rate (for customers only)
1992 0.070867 0.0707 0.004618 0.0565 0.0831
1993 0.047007 0.0463 0.004034 0.0365 0.0611
1994 0.028483 0.0284 0.002412 0.0225 0.0364
1995 0.027876 0.0277 0.002588 0.0210 0.0377
1996 0.020888 0.0207 0.001649 0.0178 0.0288
Loan interest rate (for customers only)
1992 0.1203 0.1207 0.005476 0.1011 0.1344
1993 0.0996 0.1004 0.007272 0.0558 0.1164
1994 0.0853 0.0852 0.004791 0.0708 0.1059
1995 0.0874 0.0873 0.004120 0.0742 0.1005
1996 0.0739 0.0736 0.004211 0.0636 0.0990
Interbank lending interest rate
1992 0.0818 0.0789 0.025919 0.0297 0.1333
1993 0.0716 0.0721 0.018423 0.0254 0.1163
1994 0.0581 0.0580 0.011537 0.0294 0.0912
1995 0.0573 0.0571 0.011230 0.0319 0.0970
1996 0.0559 0.0561 0.009925 0.0277 0.088547
Appendix 4. 
0($685,1*%$1.6(59,&(6$1'021,725,1* In this appendix, we
discuss the measurement of bank service accessibility/quality and monitoring
ability. In addition, we report a set of estimation results demonstrating the robust-
ness of our empirical findings to changes in the definition and functional form of
the %5$ and 3(56 variables.
0HDVXULQJ6HUYLFH$FFHVVLELOLW\DQG0RQLWRULQJ$ELOLW\In attempting
to draw an empirical distinction between information acquisition and market
power motives, we need personnel and branch measures that capture simultane-
ously banking service accessibility/quality and banks’ monitoring capability.
1
Otherwise, the testing set-up would favor one of the hypotheses over the other.
Moreover, we need to incorporate the chosen set of measures simultaneously into
the econometric equations, since if there is a role for branches, eg in banking
service accessibility, then one cannot test for a similar role for personnel without
having the branch variable in the equations. Such an omission would imply mis-
specified regression equations and an improper testing situation. It then follows
that the branch variable, however defined, needs to be valid, given that the eco-
nomic functions of personnel are controlled for in the equation. The same applies
vice versa to the personnel variable. A degree of mutual compatibility is therefore
imposed on the definitions of %5$ and 3(56.
*HRJUDSKLFDOSUR[LPLW\DQGWKHGHILQLWLRQRI%5$YDULDEOH In his study
of the determinants of banking service quality, Evanoff (1988) argues that service
accessibility and customer convenience are mainly a function of the time, distance
and cost required to obtain banking services. As direct measures for these are not
available, a measure of average distance traveled might well serve as a proxy.
Time spent and cost incurred should correlate positively with distance. Then, as-
suming that numbers of banks’ branches and customers are approximately uni-
formly distributed, the average distance traveled would correlate negatively with
the number of branches per unit of area (%5$). Accessibility could therefore be
measured using %5$.
The same argument applies in attempting to capture banks’ ability to gather
local information. Monitoring requires the acquisition and verification of infor-
mation and hence geographic proximity. The shorter the distance between a bank
and its borrowers, the more effectively the bank can obtain and authenticate in-
formation about their payoff-relevant attributes. This is also the argument of
Petersen and Rajan (2000), who provide supporting evidence on the role of dis-
tance in determining the quality of bank lending. Assuming again a uniform dis-
tribution of customers and branches, %5$ as defined, should capture these con-
siderations.
Of course, if either branches or customers or both, are not evenly distributed
within the relevant geographical area, %5$ is weaker as a measure of service ac-
                                                
1 Recall also that our empirical identification strategy rests on the homogeneity of conduct of coo-
perative banks. In addition, we hypothesize that the cooperative banks are ‘investing banks’, as
defined in our theoretical setup. We envisage thus that there should not be variation in the strate-
gies that banks choose. Instead, we are assuming that banks adjust their branch and personnel
investments optimally according to the type of the regions in which they operate. Therefore, ha-
ving similar banks that operate in different markets in time and place enables us to identify empiri-
cally the role of branches and personnel. Identification thus stems from the optimal investment
being different for each bank and year. Basically, we are jointly evaluating the hypothesis of suffi-
cient homogeneity of behavior across cooperative banks and the role of branches and personnel.48
cessibility and monitoring ability. However, Evanoff (1988) points out that such
distribution problems can be alleviated if one can control for spatially concen-
trated population, or branching. As the spatial concentration, and other regional
features, are likely to be persistent features of the banking market, the bank-
specific (market area-specific) effects in our empirical specifications account for
these deficiencies. Moreover, a measure of population density is another way to
control for the distribution of customers, and such a measure is used in the em-
pirical analysis. To sum up, there are several reasons to presume that geographic
proximity, as measured by %5$, is capable of capturing and proxying for bank
service accessibility and monitoring ability, once the type of region where the
bank is active is controlled for.
$GGLWLRQDO5REXVWQHVV7HVWV%5$ It is clear that even though we feel
that we have good reasons for our definitions of variables, a case can be made for
other definitions. We therefore consider an alternative branch variable, %5$3,
defined as the number of branches per capita.
2 We have re-estimated base equa-
tions using %5$3 (with 1992 - 1995 data, since the population variable is not
available to us for 1996). The tenor of our qualitative results remains unchanged:
%5$3 and 3(56 are negative and jointly significant in both ,17/and '() equa-
tions (for more precise estimation results, see table A4.1).
As an additional experiment, one could use the number of branches per
number of borrowers, %5$&, instead of BRA. This would probably give an indi-
cation of monitoring intensity for the current borrower base. One could however
argue that it is the potential customer base that is monitored in ex ante monitoring
models. Otherwise the bank is not able to distinguish between the more and less
creditworthy; in our theoretical monitoring model, the monitoring bank is able to
do just that. The practical problem with %5$& is that we do not have data on the
number of bank customers. However, %5$& is likely to correlate positively with
%5$3. The reason is that the larger the potential customer population, the larger
the actual customer base. This is of course a crude approximation. In any case, the
results obtained using %5$3 are at the very least indicative in this respect and they
suggest that our results ought not to be materially affected if %5$& were used.
%UDQFKOHYHO VHUYLFHPRQLWRULQJ DELOLW\ DQG WKH GHILQLWLRQ RI 3(56
3(56 is defined as personnel expenses divided by the number of branches. The
purpose of this variable is to capture the role of personnel in either banking serv-
ice quality or information acquisition, given the definition of %5$. It is thus de-
signed to proxy for the quality (and amount) of personnel at branch-level. Given
that banks’ geographic proximity is accounted for, it is the organization and func-
tion of individual branches that is relevant from the viewpoint of service quality
and monitoring ability. A more qualified and trained personnel at the branch level
should correlate positively with these, and the current 3(56variable is an average
measure of them. It obviously reflects also the average size of the personnel per
branch. The role of bank-specific effects in the empirical equations is to account
for heterogeneity, eg in number of employees working  at the headquarters.
                                                
2 Note however that though %5$3 has been used in some studies examining bank service accessi-
bility (see eg the references in Evanoff 1988), it is precisely the inverse of the measure that
Evanoff has criticized for being an inadequate measure of service accessibility. The criticism
stems from the view that urban areas are likely to have a low %5$3￿ It is however difficult to argue
that service accessibility is low in these areas. This would be the case only if congestion were an
issue. The reverse argument applies to rural areas. Whether %5$3 is a good proxy for monitoring
ability is more difficult to evaluate.49
$GGLWLRQDO 5REXVWQHVV 7HVWV 3(56 Activities unrelated to lending
might increase the level of 3(56. To account for these effects, we included
(3(56)
2 in the regression equations. They obtained negative but insignificant co-
efficients in both the ,17/ and '() equations (for results see the attached table).
In these estimations, the linear 3(56 variable obtained negative and significant
coefficients; thus our results hold eg in the presence of fixed personnel costs.
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NOTES: All GMM estimates are one-step. Numbers reported are coefficient and asymptotic stan-
dard errors (s.e.). Reported standard errors are robust to general cross-section and time-series hete-
roscedasticity. Nobs is the number of useable observations. All estimations include time dummies.
- Sargan is a test of the overidentifying restrictions for the GMM estimators. Reported numbers
are p-values.
- m1 and m2 are tests for 1
st and 2
nd order autocorrelation in the first differenced residuals (except
for OLS and within-group estimations, for which the tests are for levels residuals); they are as-
ymptotically distributed N(0,1); (p-values)
- Wald1 = Wald test of joint significance of explanatory variables (p-value)
- Wald2 = Wald test of joint significance of time dummies (p-value)
- Wald3 = Wald test of joint significance of BRA and PERS terms (p-value)